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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a self-dependent two-way
secure communication where two sources exchange confidential
messages via a wireless powered untrusted amplify-and-forward
(AF) relay and friendly jammer (FJ). By adopting the time
switching (TS) architecture at the relay, the data transmission
is accomplished in three phases: Phase I) Energy harvesting
by the untrusted relay and the FJ through non-information
transmissions from the sources, Phase II) Information transmis-
sion by the sources and jamming transmissions from the FJ to
reduce information leakage to the untrusted relay; and Phase
III) Forwarding the scaled version of the received signal from
the untrusted relay to the sources. For the proposed system, we
derive a new closed-form lower bound expression for the ergodic
secrecy sum rate (ESSR). Numerical examples are provided to
demonstrate the impacts of different system parameters such as
energy harvesting time, transmit signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and
the relay/FJ location on the secrecy performance. The numerical
results illustrate that the proposed network with friendly jam-
ming (WFJ) outperforms traditional one-way communication and
the two-way without friendly jamming (WoFJ) policy.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, Untrusted relay, Energy
harvesting, Two-way communication
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless physical-layer security (PLS) is a prominent
paradigm for improving the information transmission security
of future generation communications networks [1], [2]. Due to
the broadcast nature of wireless transmissions, PLS strategies
are designed to exploit the fading channel dynamics of the
legitimate users and potential eavesdroppers to support secure
transmission. A key area of interest is the untrusted relaying
scenario where the source-to-destination transmission is as-
sisted by a relay which may also be a potential eavesdropper
[3]. This scenario occurs in large-scale wireless systems such
as heterogeneous networks and device-to-device (D2D) com-
munication networks where confidential messages are often
retransmitted by multiple intermediate nodes.
Secure transmission utilizing an untrusted relay was first
studied in [4], where an achievable secrecy rate was derived. In
[5], it was found that introducing a friendly jammer (FJ) could
result in a positive secrecy rate for a one-way untrusted relay
link with no direct source-destination transmission. Indeed,
many recent papers on untrusted relay communications have
focused on the one-way relaying scenario [6], [7]. Recently,
several works have considered the more interesting scenario
of two-way untrusted relaying [8], [9] where physical-layer
network coding can provide security enhancement since the
relay receives a superimposed signal from the two sources
instead of each individual signal [10].
Due to the energy constraints of wireless networks, recent
research have considered the use of wireless energy harvesting
in PLS scenarios with relays and FJs [11]– [13]. To be specific,
the authors in [11] employed a FJ with wireless energy
harvesting to provide secure communication between a source
and destination in the presence of an external eavesdropper.
In [12], the authors studied secure one-way communication
via a wireless energy harvesting untrusted relay and provided
a lower bound expression for the ergodic secrecy rate. In
[13], the secrecy rate of the wireless-powered relay networks
was maximized by jointly designing power splitting and relay
beamforming techniques.
In this paper, inspired by the work in [12], [13], we propose
and analyze a new PLS scenario of wireless energy harvesting
in two-way untrusted amplify-and-forward relaying in the
presence of a FJ. Both the relay and FJ are powered by
radio frequency (RF) signals from the two source nodes under
a time switching (TS) policy. For the proposed system, we
derive a new closed-form lower bound for the ergodic secrecy
sum rate (ESSR). Numerical results show that the proposed
two-way secure communication with friendly jamming (WFJ)
provides significant security advantages compared to the one-
way communication scheme proposed in [12] and two-way
relaying without friendly jamming (WoFJ). We further discuss
important design insights into the security impact of key
system parameters including energy harvesting time ratio,
transmit signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and relay/FJ location.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND SIGNAL REPRESENTATION
We consider the PLS of a two-way communication sce-
nario illustrated in Fig. 1 where two source nodes, (S1) and
(S2) communicate with each other via an untrusted amplify-
and-forward (AF) relay (R) which acts as both a requisite
helper as well as a potential passive eavesdropper. Two secure
transmission protocols are taken into account: i) WFJ in
which one friendly jammer (FJ ) is employed to enhance the
security of the network by degrading the relay channel through
sending its jamming signal, and ii) WoFJ. Note that both R
and FJ are assumed to be energy-starved nodes, equipped
with rechargeable batteries so that they can be wirelessly
powered by the sources. It is assumed that most of the
nodes’ energy are consumed for data transmission, and energy
Fig. 1. System model of two-way secure wireless powered network via an
untrusted relay and a friendly jammer
consumption for signal processing is ignored for simplicity
[14]. In the WFJ scenario, the data exchange between two
sources is implemented in three phases. In the first phase,
shown with solid lines, S1 and S2 transmit non-information
signals to FJ and R, to charge them. It is worth mentioning
that the helper nodes, R and FJ , contribute to information
transmission until the saved energy of the received signals
in the first phase of the communication is more than the
specified minimum energy harvesting (EH) threshold. During
the second phase, the source nodes send their information
signals to the relay. Simultaneously, FJ deteriorates the relay
channel capacity by transmitting its jamming signal powered
by the sources in the first stage, as demonstrated with dashed
lines. Finally, in the third phase, the relay broadcasts the scaled
version of the received signal to the sources and then they
each extract their corresponding information signals after self-
interference cancellation. Despite the fact that FJ is able
to harvest the energy of broadcast signal from R during the
third phase, we do not consider this signal due to its high
attenuation experienced through two paths, i.e. from S1,2 toR,
and then, from R to FJ . Therefore, its power is negligible
to be harvested.
The WoFJ scenario follows the same three phases as the
WFJ scheme assuming the absence of the FJ.
A. Channel Model
In the proposed scenario, we assume that all the nodes are
equipped with a single antenna and operate in half-duplex
mode. The direct link between S1 and S2 is assumed to be
in absence, which is common in the scenarios where two
sources are located far away from each other or within heavily
shadowed areas which makes using the relay mandatory [12],
[14]. The channels are assumed to be reciprocal and follow a
quasi-static block-fading Rayleigh model [14]. Furthermore, a
key assumption is that the sources have perfect knowledge of
the jamming signal transmitted by FJ as well as the channel
state information (CSI) of S1–R, S2–R, and FJ –R channels
[8]. Let us denote hij as the channel coefficient between nodes
i and j, with channel reciprocity where hij = hji. The channel
Fig. 2. Time switching relaying protocol for two-way communication via a
wireless powered untrusted relay and a friendly jammer
power gain |hij |
2 follows an exponential distribution with
mean µij as
f|hij|2(x) =
1
µij
exp(−
x
µij
), x > 0 (1)
where f|hij|2(x) is the probability density function (pdf) of
r.v. |hij |
2.
B. Time Switching Relaying Protocol
Fig. 2 describes the proposed wireless energy harvesting
two-way relaying transmission protocol. Using the TS policy,
the relay time-switches between information processing and
energy harvesting, and completes a round of data exchange
in three phases or a period of T . To be specific, in the
first phase with duration of T1 = αT (0 < α < 1),
both R and FJ harvest the energy of the RF signals trans-
mitted by S1 and S2. In the second time slot which lasts
T2 = (1 − α)
T
2 , S1 and S2 send their information signals
to R, while FJ transmits its jamming signal, powered by
received RF signals during the first phase of communication.
Finally, in the third time slot, R broadcasts the scaled version
of the received signal.
C. Energy Harvesting at the Relay and Friendly Jammer
In the first phase, two source nodes send non-information
signals, powering bothR and FJ to obtain the required power
for activity. The received power atR and FJ are respectively,
given by (2) and (3)
PR = PS1 |hS1R|
2 + PS2 |hS2R|
2, (2)
PJ = PS1 |hS1J |
2 + PS2 |hS2J |
2. (3)
Note that PR and PJ should be more than the minimum
threshold power (ΘR) to activate the harvesting circuitry. In
the TS protocol, the harvested energy EHR and EHJ during
αT duration at R and FJ are respectively, given by
EHR = ηRαT (PS1 |hS1R|
2 + PS2 |hS2R|
2), (4)
and
EHJ = ηJαT (PS1 |hS1J |
2 + PS2 |hS2J |
2), (5)
where ηR and ηJ with 0 < ηR, ηJ < 1 represent the energy
conversion efficiency factors of R and FJ , respectively. The
relay uses the harvested energy in (4) to retransmit the source
signals in the third phase with power PTR which can be
written as
PTR =
EHR
(1− α)T2
=
2ηRα(PS1 |hS1R|
2 + PS2 |hS2R|
2)
1− α
. (6)
FJ uses the harvested energy in (5) to transmit its jamming
signal with the power of PTJ which can be expressed as
PTJ =
EHJ
(1− α)T2
=
2ηJα(PS1 |hS1J |
2 + PS2 |hS2J |
2)
1− α
. (7)
D. Information Processing at the Relay
The received signal atR, in the second phase, can be written
as
yR=
√
PS1xS1hS1R +
√
PS2xS2hS2R
+
√
PTJxJhJR + nR, (8)
where xS1 , xS2 and xJ are the S1, S2 and FJ signals with
the powers of PS1 , PS2 and PTJ , respectively. Moreover, nR
is considered as the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at
the relay and for simplicity the processing noise at the relay is
ignored [12]. Note that FJ sends its jamming signal xJ with
total power harvested in the first phase, which is higher that
the minimum threshold power for circuitry activation. Based
on the received signal yR in (8), the signal-to-interference-
plus-noise-ratio at R can be expressed as
γR=
PS1 |hS1R|
2 + PS2 |hS2R|
2
PTJ |hJR|2 +N0
=
PS1 |hS1R|
2 + PS2 |hS2R|
2
2ηJα
1−α (PS1 |hS1J |
2 + PS2 |hS2J |
2)|hJR|2 +N0
, (9)
where N0 is the noise power at R and we assume that the
relay performs multiuser decoding to estimate the signals
from S1 and S2. Finally, R broadcasts
xR = ζyR, (10)
where the scaling factor of R is
ζ =
√
PTR
PS1 |hS1R|
2 + PS2 |hS2R|
2 + PTJ |hJR|2 +N0
. (11)
E. Information Processing at the Sources
Next, we detail the received signal at S2, from which similar
expressions can be derived for the received signal at S1. By
using (8) and (10), the received signal at S2 can be expressed
as
y′S2 =hRS2xR + nS2
=
√
PS1ζhS1RhRS2xS1 +
√
PS2ζhS2RhRS2xS2
+
√
PTJζhJRhRS2xJ + ζhRS2nR + nS2 , (12)
where nS2 is the AWGN at S2 with the power N0. Since we
assume that S1 and S2 know the jamming signal (xJ ) transmit-
ted by FJ and the CSI of S1↔R, S2↔R and R↔FJ , this
means that S1 and S2 are able to cancel the self-interference
and the jamming signals in (12). Accordingly, the received
signal at S2 can be simplified as
yS2 =
√
PS1ζhS1RhRS2xS1 + ζhRS2nR + nS2 . (13)
Substituting (11) into (13), the received instantaneous end-to-
end SNR at S2 can be obtained as
γS2 =
2ηRαPS1 |hS1R|
2|hRS2 |
2
2ηRα|hRS2 |
2N0 +
N0(PTJ |hJR|2(1−α))
PS1 |hS1R|
2+PS2 |hS2R|
2+N0(1− α) + ǫ
.
(14)
where ǫ =
N2
0
(1−α)
PS1 |hS1R|
2+PS2 |hS2R|
2 . Following the same proce-
dure of S2, the received instantaneous end-to-end SNR at S1 is
given by
γS1 =
2ηRαPS2 |hS2R|
2|hRS1 |
2
2ηRα|hRS1 |
2N0 +
N0(PTJ |hJR|2(1−α))
PS1 |hS1R|
2+PS2 |hS2R|
2+N0(1− α) + ǫ
.
(15)
To make the subsequent analysis tractable, we proceed to
examine high SNR relaying regime where ǫ = 0 in (14) and
(15).
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we first derive closed-form expressions
for the power outage probability at the relay and the FJ.
Then, analytical expressions and closed-form lower bound
expressions are evaluated for both the cases of WFJ and WoFJ.
A. Power Outage Probability at the Relay
The received power at the relay must be greater than
the minimum power threshold ΘR to activate the energy
harvesting circuitry. If the received power PR, in (2), is less
than the threshold power ΘR, the power outage probability
occurs, which is defined as
Ppor = P (PR < ΘR) (16)
The power outage probability at the relay is computed using
the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The power outage probability at the relay is
calculated as
Ppor =


1−
PS2µS2R
PS2µS2R−PS1µS1R
exp(− ΘR
PS2µS2R
)
+
PS1µS1R
PS2µS2R−PS1µS1R
exp(− ΘR
PS1µS1R
),mx 6= my
Υ(2,mΘR), mx = my
∆
= m
(17)
where mx =
1
PS1µS1R
, my =
1
PS2µS2R
, and Υ(s, x) =∫ x
0 t
(s−1)e−tdt is the lower incomplete Gamma function [16].
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 1. The power outage probability expression
at FJ (Ppoj) can be obtained similar to Ppor, by replacing
µS1R = µS1J and µS2R = µS2J in (17).
B. Ergodic Secrecy Sum Rate
The ergodic secrecy rate characterizes the rate below which
the average secure communication transmission is not achiev-
able [1]. For our proposed system, the instantaneous secrecy
rate Rsec can be expressed as [8]
Rsec = [IS1 + IS2 − IR]
+
, (18)
where
IK =
(1 − α)
2
log2(1 + γK), (19)
and K ∈ {S1, S2, R}. By combining (18) and (19), the
ESSR can be rewritten as
Rsec =
[
(1− α)
2
log2
(1 + γS1)(1 + γS2)
(1 + γR)
]+
, (20)
where [x]+ = max(x, 0) and the pre-log factor 1−α2 is due
to the effective time of information exchange between the two
sources. Moreover, γR, γS1 and γS2 are given by (9), (14) and
(15), respectively.
Based on (20) and the relay and FJ’s power outage proba-
bility, the exact expression of the ESSR can be written as
R¯sec = (1− Ppoj)(1− Ppor)E {Rsec}. (21)
which can be further expressed as
R¯sec=(1− Ppoj)(1 − Ppor)
×
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
R(x, y, z, w, u)
× fX(x)fY (y)fZ(z)fU (u)fW (w)dxdydzdudw,(22)
where
R(x, y, z, w, u) =
[
(1 − α)
2
log2
(1 + γS2)(1 + γS1)
(1 + γR)
]+
,
(23)
where we define X=|hS1R|
2, Y =|hS2R|
2, Z=|hS1J |
2, W=
|hS2J |
2 and U=|hRJ |
2 in the r.v.s of γR, γS1 and γS2 .
While the multiple integral expression in (22) can be
easily evaluated numerically, a closed-form expression is not
straightforward to obtain. As such, we proceed by obtaining a
closed-form lower bound expression for the ESSR.
Proposition 2. The lower bound expression R¯LB for the
ergodic secrecy sum rate R¯sec given by (21) can be stated
as
R¯LB = (1− Ppoj)(1− Ppor)
1− α
2 ln(2)
[T1 + T2 − T3]
+
, (24)
where
T1 ≈ ln

1 + 2ηRαPS1µS2RµS1R2ηRαµS2RN0 +N0(1− α) + 2N0ηJ
× αµRJ (PS1µS1J + PS2µS2J)E {H}

 , (25)
T2 ≈ ln

1 + 2ηRαPS2µS2RµS1R2ηRαµS1RN0 +N0(1− α) + 2N0ηJ
× αµRJ (PS1µS1J + PS2µS2J)E {H}

 , (26)
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Fig. 3. ESSR versus the time switching ratio of one-way, two-way
WoFJ, and two-way WFJ scenarios.
T3 ≈ ln
(
1 +
PS1µS1R + PS2µS2R
2ηJα
1−α (PS1µS1J + PS2µS2J)µRJ +N0
)
, (27)
and
E (H) =


ln
(
µR
µS
)
µR−µS
, µS 6= µR
1
µ
. µS = µR
∆
= µ
(28)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Remark 2. As shown in the numerical results, the lower
bound expression in (24) is tight enough in high SNR regime.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we provide some numerical results to verify
the accuracy of the provided expressions. We set PS1 = PS2 =
10 dBW, ηR = ηJ = 0.7, the minimum EH circuitry threshold
ΘR = 0 dBm, the noise power N0 = −10 dBm, dS1R =
dS2R = dS1J = dS2J = 2dRJ = 3m, the mean channel power
gain µij = d
−ρ
ij and the path-loss exponent ρ = 2.7 similar to
[15].
Fig. 3 shows that the ESSR is a quasi-concave function of
the time switching ratio. For the given system parameters, the
maximum ESSR are obtained at αopt = 0.28, αopt = 0.38 and
αopt = 0.62, for one-way, two-way WFJ and two-way WoFJ,
respectively. This highlights the importance of the TS ratio
which should be taken into account in the system design. This
observation means that the security of the network is highly
dependent on the both jamming strategy (WFJ or WoFJ) and
the TS ratio. If the TS ratio is too low, the harvested energy at
the relay (and the FJ) may be too low and then, power outage
may occur or the received SNR at the sources may be too low.
On the other hand, if the TS ratio is too high, insufficient time
is dedicated for the relay to broadcast the information signal
and hence, the received instantaneous end-to-end SNR at the
receivers may be too low. As such, the figure reveals a trade-off
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between a secure transmission and a reliable communication
which will be taken into account in our future work.
Fig. 4 plots the ESSR versus transmit SNR of one-way, two-
way WFJ, and two-way WoFJ scenarios. We observe that: 1)
The exact numerical expression in (22) is well-approximated in
the high SNR regime by our derived closed-form lower bound
expression in (24), 2) The ESSR is significantly enhanced as
the transmit SNR increases for both the one-way scenario [12]
and the proposed two-way communication scenarios, 3) In the
high SNR regime the proposed two-way WFJ communication
outperforms the one-way scenario. For example, at SNR = 50
dB, the ESSR of the two-way WFJ scenario is 1 bit/s/Hz more
than that the one-way transmission scenario provides; approxi-
mately two times as much as it does, and 4) Evidently, the high
SNR-slope of the proposed two-way WFJ communication is
twice the one-way scenario and the two-way WoFJ scenario.
Fig. 5 illustrates the impact of distances between the net-
work nodes on the ESSR. We assume that all the nodes
except S1-S2 are located in equal distances from each other
denoted by d. One interesting result from Fig. 5 is that
the proposed two-way WFJ scenario significantly outperforms
the one-way and two-way WoFJ communications when the
network nodes are close together, i.e. d = 2m. It is also
observed that in this topology, the energy harvesting time is
much less than the broadcasting time to achieve the optimal
ESSR. Moreover, by extending the network scale to d = 5m,
the maximum ESSR can be achieved if more time is dedicated
to RF energy harvesting. In other words, as observed in Fig.
5, for the given system parameters of the WFJ scenario, the
maximum ESSR with respect to α is achieved when we set
α = 0.75. Consequently, to achieve the maximum ESSR of the
proposed WFJ scenario, the more time is required to harvest
RF energy in the first phase as the network topology extends.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a wirelessly powered two-way
cooperative network in which two sources communicate via
an untrusted relay. To enhance the secrecy rate, a friendly
jammer (FJ) is employed. We adapted the time switching (TS)
protocol at the relay and investigated the ergodic secrecy sum
rate (ESSR) with friendly jamming (WFJ). An accurate lower
bound expression was derived for the ESSR. Numerical results
revealed the priority of the proposed two-way communica-
tion. Furthermore, novel engineering insights were discussed
regarding the impact of TS ratio, SNR and node locations on
the ESSR.
APPENDIX A
The power outage probability at R is represented by
Ppor = P (PR < ΘR) ,
where PR = X + Y , and X = PS1 |hS1R|
2 and Y =
PS2 |hS2R|
2 are two exponential r.v.s with means equal to
1
mx
= PS1µS1R and
1
my
= PS2µS2R, respectively. Accord-
ingly, the probability density function of S can be obtained
as
fS(s) =
∫ s
0
fXY (x, s− x)dx
(a)
=
∫ s
0
fX(x)fY (s− x)dx
=
∫ s
0
mxe
−mxxmye
−my(s−x)dx
=
{
m2se−ms, mx = my
∆
= m
mxmy
mx−my
(e−mxs − e−mys) , mx 6= my
(29)
where s can take only non-negative values and (a) follows
from the fact that two r.v.s X and Y are independent. Then,
using (29), we can write
Ppor = P (S < ΘR) =
∫ ΘR
0
fS(s)ds. (30)
By evaluating the integral expression (30), we arrive at the
Ppor in (17).
APPENDIX B
The lower bound expression of the ESSR R¯sec can be
written as follows
R¯sec = (1 − Ppoj)(1− Ppor)
× E
{
(1 − α)
2
[
log2
(1 + γS2)(1 + γS1)
(1 + γR)
]+}
(31)
(a)
≥ (1 − Ppoj)(1− Ppor)
×
[
E
{
(1 − α)
2
(
log2
(1 + γS2)(1 + γS1)
(1 + γR)
)}]+
= (1 − Ppoj)(1− Ppor)×[
1− α
2 ln(2)
(
E {ln (1 + γS2)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
+ E {ln (1 + γS1)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
− E {ln (1 + γR)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
T3
) ]+
∆
= R¯LB,
(32)
where inequality (a) follows from the fact that
E {max(X,Y )} ≥ max(E{X},E{Y }) [16]. Moreover,
for any positive r.v.s X and Y, the following approximation
can be used [17]
E
{
ln
(
1 +
X
Y
)}
≈ ln
(
1 +
E {X}
E {Y }
)
.
Based on the above approximation and using the expression
(14), the part T1 is given by
T1 ≈ ln

1 +
E {2ηRαPS1XY }
E
{
2ηRαY N0 +N0(1− α)
+
2N0ηJα(PS1Z+PS2W )U
PS1X+PS2Y
}

 . (33)
Since the r.v.s X, Y, Z, W and U are independent, by using
the expression (15), we can conclude (25). T2 and T3 can be
calculated in the same way as T1, and (26) and (27) are ob-
tained. Finally, to evaluate E(H), we define H= 1
PS1X+PS2Y
as a new r.v. Let us denote R = PS1X , S = PS2Y as two
exponential r.v.s with the means equal to µR = PS1µS1R
and µS = PS2µS2R, respectively. Using (29), fH(h) can be
calculated as
fH(h) =


exp
(
− 1
hµS
)
−exp
(
− 1
hµR
)
h2(µS−µR)
, µR 6= µS
1
hµ2
exp(− 1
hµ
), µR = µS
∆
= µ
(34)
By computing E(H) =
∫∞
0
hfH(h)dh, (28) is proved.
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